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I attempt to explain why compensating differentials for job disamenities are difficult to 
observe. I focus on the match between workers’ preferences for routine jobs and the 
variability in tasks associated with the job. Using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal 
Study, I find that mismatched workers report lower job satisfaction and earn lower 
wages. Both male and female workers in routinized jobs earn, on average, 12% less than 
their counterparts in non-routinized jobs. Once preferences and mismatch are accounted 
for, this difference decreases to 8% for men and 5% for women. Accounting for 
mismatch is important when analyzing compensating differentials. 
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For more than thirty years, labor economists have been trying to find evidence of wage 
premiums for jobs that involve such disamenities as physical effort, routine nature of the 
work, or job insecurity. According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, 
which goes back to Adam Smith and involves the framework of analysis outlined by 
Rosen (1974), workers must receive a wage premium for suffering from job disamenities, 
ceteris paribus. However, a survey of the evidence has concluded that “tests of the theory 
of compensating wage differentials are inconclusive with respect to every job 
characteristic except risk of death” (Borjas, 2005, Chapter 6, p. 224, italics added). 
It is obvious that on-the-job risk of death is an undesirable job characteristic, and 
the available empirical evidence indeed suggests that wages are positively associated 
with on-the-job risk of death (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). However, many other job 
characteristics are not regarded as intrinsically undesirable by all workers. Instead, the 
desirability of a large number of job attributes depends crucially on individual workers’ 
tastes or personalities. Smith (1979) notes that the heterogeneity of worker tastes make 
testing for compensating wage differentials difficult. 
At first glance, preference heterogeneity may seem consistent with mixed results 
for repetitive work. For example, Lucas (1977) finds evidence of significant 
compensation for repetitive work, while Brown (1980) reports a negative estimate. 
Almost twenty years later, the mixed results are even more striking. Daniel and Sofer 
(1998) present some such results in their paper. 
One straightforward way to account for preference heterogeneity when looking 
for compensating wage differentials is to run separate wage regressions for workers with 
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different preferences. Still, as I show in the next section, non-routine-preferring workers 
earn lower wages in routinized jobs, which is contrary to what the theory of 
compensating wage differentials would predict. Therefore, preference heterogeneity by 
itself does not explain the puzzle of compensating wage differentials. 
Why, even after accounting for preference heterogeneity, are compensating wage 
differentials not observed? What if workers’ preferences for one type of job (or job 
attribute) are related to their productivity in performing that type of job? Workers’ tastes 
for a certain job attribute may correlate with their comparative advantage in such jobs. 
This is not the same as saying that preferences can have a direct effect on wages, 
independent of the type of job; i.e., workers with different preferences may have different 
absolute advantages in performing any job. Rather, the key insight here is that when 
workers’ preferences do not match job attributes, they are less productive. For example, 
non-routine-preferring workers are likely to be more productive in non-routinized jobs 
than routine-preferring workers. By the same token, routine-preferring workers are likely 
to be more productive in routinized jobs than non-routine-preferring workers.  
If matching were perfect and each worker was assigned to a job according to 
comparative advantage, then the marginal routine-preferring worker would be willing to 
pay for working in a routinized job. Similarly, the marginal non-routine-preferring 
worker would need to be compensated for working in a routinized job. This would be 
consistent with the compensating wage differentials theory.  
However, as Lang and Majumdar (2004) pointed out, both casual empiricism and 
research show that matching is imperfect. More recently, Shimer (2007) acknowledges 
that skills and geographical location of workers are poorly matched with the skill 
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requirement and location of jobs: unemployed workers are attached to an occupation and 
a geographic location where jobs with their skills are currently scarce. Here, a similar 
point can be made. As I will show, a mismatch between workers’ preferences and job 
attributes does exist, and must be taken into account when looking for compensating 
wage differentials. 
I propose a simple assignment model with Nash bargaining over wages for 
analyzing the role of mismatch on wages. If mismatch is simply a disamenity and has no 
effect on worker productivity, then my model is consistent with the standard prediction of 
the theory of compensating wage differentials: workers are compensated for being 
mismatched (i.e., there is a compensating wage differential effect). However, once 
mismatch is acknowledged to affect worker’s output (productivity effect), its effect on 
the wage rate is ambiguous. Although workers need to be compensated when their 
preferences do not match the work requirements of performing a job task, the occurrence 
of mismatch also decreases their productivity, thus reducing the surplus to be divided 
between workers and firms, and ultimately decreasing wages. 
This simple framework offers a rationale for the existence of mixed estimates for 
compensating wage differentials. Indeed, in the literature the standard estimates may 
confound the effect on wages of the job attribute being analyzed with the one attributable 
to mismatch. 
This paper focuses on job routinization (i.e., jobs involving repetitive and routine 
tasks). I consider this is an important job attribute to study because estimates for it in the 
literature are mixed (e.g., Lucas, 1977, Brown, 1980, Daniel and Sofer, 1998). So, this 
analysis may shed new light on the sources  of  these  mixed  results.  Furthermore,              
3 
Table 1 shows that 29% of male workers and 36% of female workers report that “being 
able to do different things rather than the same things over and over” is “much more 
important than high pay”. Indeed, the Table indicates that variability of tasks is one of the 
most highly valued characteristics on the job for workers. This suggests that it should be 
easier to find compensating wage differentials for job routinization than for other job 
attributes. 
Using data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS), I find that mismatched 
workers earn lower wages and are less satisfied with their jobs than well-matched 
workers, as predicted by my model. My results also indicate that accounting for 
mismatch is important in obtaining more reliable estimates of compensating wage 
differentials. On average, male workers in routinized jobs are paid 12% less than workers 
in non-routinized jobs, after accounting for: differences in IQ measured at high school, 
high school rank, firm size, and industry type. This difference decreases to 11% after 
accounting for differences in the preference for routine work. Furthermore, controlling 
for mismatch reduces the difference in average wages between male workers in 
routinized versus non-routinized jobs to 8%. For female workers, the difference decreases 
from 12% to 5%. 
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the puzzle in the 
compensating wage differentials literature. Section 3 presents a model that sheds light on 
the puzzle. Section 4 describes the WLS dataset and the econometric specifications and 
presents some descriptive statistics. My results are in Section 5. Section 6 offers some 
robustness checks. In Section 7 I discuss the caveats of my analysis. Finally, Section 8 
concludes. 
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2. The Puzzle 
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith noted that workers with the same level of 
competence should be paid different wages if their working conditions are different. 
Rosen (1974) formalizes Adam Smith’s ideas showing that, under perfect competition, 
identical workers need to be compensated for job disamenities
1. 
The standard method for testing the prediction of this theory is to estimate a wage 
regression with characteristics of the job (z) and personal characteristics (p). In general, 
the equation is of the form: 
  ε p ρ z β α w + + + = ) ln(   (1)
For an undesirable job attribute, the theory predicts that β > 0. However, the empirical 
evidence on compensating wage differentials is mixed for job characteristics other than 
the risk of death. 
There have been several previous attempts at solving this puzzle. First, the 
estimates may suffer from selection bias: workers choosing a job with a specific 
undesirable attribute may have less distaste for such an attribute (e.g., Kostiuk, 1990). 
Second, working conditions are endogenously determined: richer individuals are more 
able to bargain over working conditions than poorer individuals (e.g., Garen, 1988). 
Third, omitted variables can also lead to biased estimates because of the correlation 
between unobserved skills, individual productivities, and the quality of working 
conditions (e.g., Brown, 1980, Duncan and Holmlund, 1983, Hwang, Reed and Hubard, 
1992). Fourth, when working conditions are reported by the workers themselves, the 
estimates are likely to suffer from simultaneity bias (e.g., McNabb, 1989). Further, if 
                                                 
1 A classical discussion on the theory of equalizing differences is offered in Rosen (1986). Chapter 7 in 
Polacheck and Siebert (1999), Chapter 5 in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), and Chapter 6 in Borjas (2005), 
provide excellent reviews of the theory of compensating wage differentials. 
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answers to survey questions about working conditions are given in subjective terms, then 
the estimates are likely to suffer from subjectivity biases (e.g., McNabb, 1989). Finally, 
when worker conditions are defined using average occupation (or industry) 
characteristics and then matched to individual workers, misclassification bias may arise. 
From a theoretical point of view, this paper can be thought of as an extension of 
the first explanation given above. Therefore, I start by presenting the implications of 
preference heterogeneity (about the attractive or unattractive features of performing a job 
task) for estimates of compensating wage differentials.  
Suppose there are two types of workers: those who enjoy z (x = 1) and those who 
have distaste for z ( x = 0). In that case, to test the theory of compensating wage 
differentials, the following regressions should be run: 
  0 0 0 0 ) ln( ε ρ β α + + + = p z w     if  x = 0  (2)
   1 1 1 1 ) ln( ε ρ β α + + + = p z w       if  x = 1 (3)
If the theory is correct, I should find evidence on β0 > 0 and β1 < 0: workers who have 
distaste for z (x = 0) are compensated for working in a job involving high levels of z, 
while workers who enjoy z (x = 1) are willing to pay for working in a job involving high 
levels of z. With these predictions at hand, I can assess the existence of compensating 
wage differentials for job routinization depending on workers’ preferences.  
I start by measuring job routinization as the fraction of time at work doing the 
same things over and over. Routine-preferring workers (x = 1) are defined as those 
individuals who strongly agree, moderately agree, slightly agree, or neither agree nor 
disagree, with the statement “I see myself as someone who prefers work that is routine 
and simple”.  
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Table 2 reports the degree of job routinization by occupational category for men 
and women, respectively. As the Table makes clear, “Professional and Technical 
Specialty Operations”, and “Executive, Administrative, and Managerial” occupational 
categories on average involve less routinization, while occupations such as “Operators 
and Fabricators” involve more routinization of tasks. Another interesting feature that 
emerges from this table is that female workers tend to spend a higher fraction of time 
than male workers doing the same things over and over. In other words, women tend to 
do more routinized tasks than men within occupational categories. 
The results from Table 3 show evidence contrary to the theory of compensating 
wage differentials: workers with lower preferences for routine and simple work earn 
lower wages in the routinized jobs. Column (2) shows that non-routine-preferring male 
workers do not appear to be compensated for working in routinized jobs; rather, if 
anything, they appear to be penalized. The addition of several controls does not change 
this conclusion. Looking at the rest of even columns, from (4) to (16), I find the same 
result: for non-routine-preferring workers, on average, the higher is the fraction of 
working time doing the same things over and over, the lower is the hourly wage. For 
routine-preferring workers, I do not find a statistically significant association between job 
routinization and hourly wages. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Table 4 for 
women. 
It is worth noting that controlling for education, IQ measured at high school, and 
high school rank seems to be a credible way of accounting for differences in workers’ 
abilities and skills. At the same time, controlling for firm size and industry type appears 
to be a reasonable strategy for accounting for technology differences across firms. 
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Moreover, a careful examination of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that the coefficients on the 
covariates are very similar for both groups of workers. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the results from these tables are not driven either by unobserved workers’ 
abilities or by unobserved firms’ technologies. Notice that the constant term in each 
group-of-worker-specific regression captures a fixed effect (e.g., fixed ability, α0 and α1, 
respectively) for each group of workers.  
The bottom line of Tables 3 and 4 is that preference heterogeneity clearly matters, 
but in a surprisingly opposite way to what one would have expected from a selection-bias 
explanation: workers with lower preference for routine and simple work earn lower 
wages in routinized jobs. This paper provides an explanation for such a finding. 
Notice that the implicit assumption behind the prediction of a positive association 
between job routinization and wages for non-routine-preferring workers is that they must 
be compensated because of their higher disutility when working in routinized jobs. 
However, non-routine-preferring workers are likely to be less productive in routinized 
jobs. In other words, workers’ preferences are likely to reflect two things that are equally 
important for wage determination: their disutility from working, which will be higher as 
the discrepancy between preferences and job attributes (characteristics or job tasks) 
increases; and their comparative advantage on the job, which will be lower as the 
discrepancy between preferences and job attributes increases. 
If matching were perfect, and each worker was assigned to a job according to her 
comparative advantage, then the productivity effect of comparative advantage would not 
play any role: productivity would be the same for every worker, because every worker 
would be assigned to a job where her comparative advantage was maximized. However, 
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matching is far from perfect, and neglecting its influence on wages is likely to confound 
the compensating wage differentials estimates. 
To better understand the estimates from Tables 3 and 4, consider the following 
case. There are two types of jobs (z = {0,1}) and two types of workers (x = {0,1}). Some 
workers and firms are matched with their types (0,0) and (1,1), while some others are 
mismatched (0,1) and (1,0). The econometric model is given by: 
  ε x z m δ x γ z β α w + + + + = ) , ( ) ln( (4)
The mismatch measure m is equal to 1 if z  =  x, and 0 otherwise. Assuming 
that 0 ) , ( = x z ε E , Figure 1 summarizes the expected log wages for each worker-job pair. 
Notice that the coefficients β0 and β1 in equations (2) and (3) are capturing two different 
effects in terms of the model in (4): β0 = β + δ and β1 = β – δ, where δ is picking up the 
mismatch effect. If we are willing to assume that the compensating wage differential 
applies to anyone working in the routinized sector whether the worker prefers routine or 
non-routine work, but that the productivity effect applies only to workers who are 
mismatched, that is, whose sectors do not match their preferences, then β will capture the 
compensating wage differential effect while δ will capture the mismatch productivity 
effect.  
Thus, a potential explanation for the puzzling results in Tables 3 and 4 is that 
preferences for performing a job and the worker’s comparative advantage in performing 
it are (positively) correlated. If this is the case, then workers with lower preference for 
routine and simple work will earn lower wages in routinized jobs, not because they are 
not compensated for taking such jobs but because they are less productive in performing 
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them. Indeed, my estimates suggest that δ < 0, and that the wage penalty associated with 
job routinization decreases by a large amount once mismatch is taken into account.   
Tables 5 and 6 report similar estimates to those in Tables 3 and 4 but use a binary 
indicator for job routinization rather than a continuous variable. 
 
3. The Model 
In this section I present a simple assignment model with Nash bargaining to show the 
effect of mismatch on the wage rate. The main purpose of the model is to show the 
importance of the mismatch productivity effect on the wage rate, and its relevance for 
understanding estimates of compensating wage differentials. 
In my setting, workers and firms are randomly matched. One can think of a 
situation where workers are indifferent between different job alternatives because of 
search costs (due to informational asymmetries between firms and workers, or 
geographical dispersion of jobs and workers) and they randomly pick up one of the 
available jobs
2. Wage determination occurs through generalized Nash bargaining 
(interpretations of such a solution in terms of strategic bargaining theory are provided in 
Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005). To simplify the problem, the threat points are 
assumed to be zero. 
                                                 
2 In Shimer (2007) workers and jobs are randomly allocated to labor markets. My model simply assumes 
that each firm is randomly matched with each worker. Although it is beyond the scope of the paper to 
provide a rationale for the existence of mismatch, one can think of a situation with imbalances between 
labor supply and labor demand, informational asymmetries, or geographical dispersion as mismatch 
determinants. First, expansion or contraction of industries in response to changes in the demand for goods 
and services, new technologies introduced in the workplace, changes in the organization of work, etc., on 
the demand side, and demographic changes, changes in preferences across generations, etc., on the supply 
side, may lead to imbalances between labor supply and labor demand. Second, informational asymmetries 
between workers and firms and geographical dispersion of both workers and firms pose difficulties for the 
proper matching between specific jobs and specific workers. Acquiring information on both the available 
type of jobs and the available types of workers is costly. Mobility costs of geographical dispersion are also 
important. 
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To begin with, consider a static game where there is a continuum of workers’ 
types x∈[0,1] and a continuum of firms’ types z∈[0,1]. Each firm is randomly matched 
with each worker: (z,x) for each firm-worker pair. Notice that the (z,x) pairs are not 
determined endogenously but rather taken as randomly given. Once the matching is 
complete, the firm z and the worker x bargain over the division of the match surplus to 
decide the optimal wage. Two cases can be distinguished: the benchmark case, with no 
mismatch productivity effect, and the new case, with mismatch productivity effect. 
 
3.1. The Benchmark Case: mismatch is simply a disamenity 
The profit function of the firm is given by  
  w A π − =   (5)
where A is gross revenue (production) and w is the wage rate. 
The utility function of the worker is given by 
  )) , ( ( )) , ( ( x z m v w x z m u − =   (6)
where  v is the disutility from work, which depends positively on mismatch m(z,x) 
between the job characteristic z and the worker’s preference x. Then mismatch can be 
seen as a disamenity, v’ > 0. Tinbergen (1975) assumes utility to be determined by a 
quadratic loss function dependent upon discrepancies between  job  and  personal               
attribute values.  
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem is obtained from   
  } )) , ( ( { max
1 θ θ
w x z m u π
−   (7)
where 0 < θ <1 measures the firm bargaining power. 
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The FOC gives us the optimal wage rate: 
  A θ x z m v θ x z m w ) 1 ( )) , ( ( )) , ( (
* − + = (8)
The benefits for the firm and the worker are: 
  ))] , ( ( [ )) , ( (
* x z m v A θ x z m π − =   (9)
  ))] , ( ( )[ 1 ( )) , ( (
* x z m v A θ x z m u − − = (10)
The effect of mismatch on the optimal wage rate is obtained from differentiating 
(8) with respect to m(z,x): 
 
)) , ( ( '
) , (
)) , ( (
*
x z m v θ
x z m




Mismatch, which is a disamenity, does affect the wage rate positively (v’ > 0). This is 
consistent with the standard prediction of the theory of compensating wage differentials. 
 
3.2. The New Case: mismatch also affects productivity 
In the previous case, mismatch only affects the disutility of work: mismatch plays the 
role of a pure disamenity. However, mismatch is also likely to affect the firm’s gross 
revenue (output). 
A worker can be compensated for the disutility of performing a routinized job 
because he has a distaste for repetitive things. This distaste is likely to be negatively 
correlated with his ability to do repetitive things, i.e., comparative advantage in doing 
repetitive things. In other words, the worker’s taste or preference for a type of job and his 
comparative advantage on that type of job are likely to be positively correlated. In this 
more general case, the profit function of the firm may be rewritten as  
  w x z m A x z m π − = )) , ( ( )) , ( ( (12)
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where  A is gross revenue (production), which now depends negatively on mismatch 
m(z,x) between the job characteristic z and the worker’s preference x, and w is the wage 
rate. Mismatch now also affects productivity: A’< 0. Tinbergen (1975) sets a production 
function that depends on the extent to which a person’s abilities match those required in 
the execution of a job task. 
The utility function still is given by (6), and the solution to the Nash bargaining 
problem must acknowledge that the profit function is different. Again, the FOC gives us 
the optimal wage rate: 
  )) , ( ( ) 1 ( )) , ( ( )) , ( (
* x z m A θ x z m v θ x z m w − + = (13)
The benefits for the firm and the worker are: 
  ))] , ( ( )) , ( ( [ )) , ( (
* x z m v x z m A θ x z m π − =   (14)
  ))] , ( ( )) , ( ( )[ 1 ( )) , ( (
* x z m v x z m A θ x z m u − − = (15)
The effect of mismatch on the optimal wage rate comes from differentiating (13) 
with respect to m(z,x): 
 
)) , ( ( ' ) 1 ( )) , ( ( '
) , (
)) , ( (
*
x z m A θ x z m v θ
x z m






The expression for the mismatch effect on the wage rate now has two different 
components. The first term in (16) is what I obtained in (11): it is positive (v’ > 0) and 
measures the compensating wage differential effect due to mismatch. However, there is a 
new term that did not appear in (11): this term is negative (A’ < 0) and measures the 
productivity effect due to mismatch. Hence, the total effect of mismatch is ambiguous
3. 
                                                 
3 Borghans et al. (2006) show that the effect of people skills on wages (in the equilibrium assignment) can 
be decomposed into two effects: first, workers with more people skills earn more because they generate 
higher (net) revenue (productivity effect); second, workers with more people skills take jobs where people 
tasks are more important and these jobs pay less, all else equal (compensating wage differential effect). 
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3.3. Main Implications of the Model 
My model leads to two main propositions: 
Proposition 1. When mismatch also affects gross revenue (output), it has an 
ambiguous effect on the wage rate. If the productivity effect dominates the compensating 
wage differential effect, then mismatch affects the wage rate negatively. If the reverse is 
the case, then mismatch affects the wage rate positively. If both effects cancel each other 
out, then mismatch has no effect on the wage rate. 
Proof. See equation (16). 
Proposition 2. Mismatch has a negative effect on utility. 
Proof.  0 ))] , ( ( ' )) , ( ( ' )[ 1 (
) , (
)) , ( (
*
< − − =
∂
∂
x z m v x z m A θ
x z m
x z m u
. 
These propositions are investigated empirically in the results section. 
 
3.4. Implications of the Model for Estimates of Compensating Wage Differentials 
Note that in the previous model, each worker-firm pair bargains over the match surplus in 
order to decide the optimal wage. However, in a market setting, the optimal wage arises 
from the interaction between labor supply (workers) and demand (firms). Thus, one 
question arises immediately: what are the implications of my assignment model for 
standard compensating wage differentials that emerge from a market setting? To answer 
this, I need to make two assumptions. 
First, I need to assume that the compensating wage differential applies to anyone 
working in the routinized sector (assuming that it is the sector with a shortage of workers 
in the absence of pay differentials), whether he prefers routine or non-routine work. By 
contrast, the productivity effect applies only to workers who are mismatched, whose 
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sectors do not match their preferences. Thus, my model yields three parameters that are 
captured in (4) and represented in Figure 1: a routine sector main effect (the 
compensating wage differential, β);  a routine-preferring worker main effect (the 
absolute advantage of this type of worker, γ); and a negative wage effect for workers 
who are in a sector other than the one they prefer (the negative productivity effect due 
to mismatch, δ). 
Next, I need a key identifying assumption: the observation that a worker is 
mismatched does not provide any information about that worker’s skill (i.e., his absolute 
advantage), once his preferences and other observable characteristics are controlled for. 
Given that I have a rich set of observables, including IQ scores, this seems a plausible 
assumption. 
The estimates reported in Figure 1 are easy to follow with the model above. 
Nevertheless, it is helpful to reinterpret them in a standard difference-in-difference 
framework. Consider the following specification: 
  * * * * * ) ln( ε zx δ x γ z β α w + + + + = (17)
where δ
* = –2δ > 0.  
Notice that the negative productivity effect of being mismatched corresponds to a 
positive interaction between a worker’s taste for routinized work and the degree to which 
her observed job is routinized. Figure 2 can be compared with Figure 1. 
Although I am going to focus on the analysis of estimates from specification (4), 
for the sake of comparison the estimates from specification (17) are reported in the 
robustness checks section. 
 
15 
4. Data and Econometric Specifications 
I use data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison
4. The sample contains information on 10,317 men and women who graduated 
from Wisconsin high schools in 1957, approximately one-third of all seniors in 
Wisconsin high schools in 1957. It contains a rich set of self-reported information from 
sample members, siblings, and parents, as well as administrative data, collected in a 
series of surveys: 1957 (graduates), 1964 (graduates), 1975 (graduates), 1977 (siblings), 
1992-3 (graduates), 1993-4 (siblings) and 2003-5 (graduates and spouses). 
I focus on the 1992-3 waves, when respondents were in their early fifties. This 
decision is based on both informational requirements and sample (size and selectivity) 
considerations. First of all, information on workers’ preferences is not available prior to 
the 1992-3 waves. Second, participation in the labor market is higher for people in their 
fifties (1992-3 waves) than in their sixties (2003-5 waves): 92.4% of men were employed 
in 1992 while only 47.8% of them were employed in 2004. Finally, this helps me to 
minimize non-random attrition problems. 
The WLS dataset offers an opportunity for exploring the role of mismatch in 
observing compensating wage differentials. It contains a set of individual characteristics, 
such as IQ score measured at high school, high school rank, education, preferences, 
wages, job satisfaction, hours of work, number of hours performing different tasks on the 
                                                 
4 This research uses data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. Since 1991, the WLS has been supported principally by the National Institute on Aging (AG-
9775 and AG-21079), with additional support from the Vilas Estate Trust, the National Science 
Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, and the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. A 
public use file of data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study is available from the Wisconsin Longitudinal 
Study, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706 and at 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wls/data/. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors. The WLS has 
been used before to estimate the returns associated with IQ (Zax and Rees, 2002) and personality traits 
(Mueller and Plug, 2006). Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2006) also use this dataset. 
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job, etc. Moreover, the sample is quite homogeneous (high school graduates from 
Wisconsin high schools in 1957), which makes any concerns about omitted variables             
less important. 
My sample is restricted to workers who were both Wisconsin residents and were 
employed in 1992, and it excludes individuals who were: working less than 20 hours per 
week, self-employed, employees of their own company, or family workers. Farm workers 
and members of the military also are excluded from my sample. The presence of extreme 
values in the wage distribution was detected accidentally through the comparison of 
average wages for men and women. To avoid the estimates being driven by extreme 
values in the wage distribution, I trim the tails of the log-wage distribution at both the 3% 
bottom and the 3% top. 
 
4.1. Definition of the main variables 
The main variables in this paper are job routinization; worker’s preference for routine; 
and mismatch, i.e., the discrepancy between job routinization and worker’s preference for 
routine. In this subsection, I discuss how these variables are measured. 
The job routinization indicator (z) —whether a job is classified as routinized or 
non-routinized— is constructed using the fraction of working time doing the same things 
over and over: job routinization is measured as 1 (routinized job) if the fraction of 
working  time  doing  the  same  things  over  and  over  is  equal  to  or  higher  than  0.5.                       
I compute this fraction as the ratio of the number of weekly hours doing the same things 
over and over on the job to the total number of weekly working hours. Note that the 
reported number of hours can be compared across individuals; this addresses standard 
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subjectivity bias concerns due to workers’ subjective assessments about working 
conditions. Moreover, the fact that the number of hours worked is reported by the 
workers themselves confronts the misclassification bias that is attributable to imprecise 
matching of average job (occupation or industry) characteristics to individuals whose job 
characteristics may depart (by and large) from the average characteristics within their 
occupation or industry
5. 
The  worker’s preference for routine indicator (x) —whether a worker is 
classified as a routine-preferring worker or a non-routine-preferring worker— is 
measured by the response to this question: “To what extent do you see yourself as 
someone who prefers work that is routine and simple?” The possible answers to this 
question are: agree strongly, agree moderately, agree slightly, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree slightly, disagree moderately, disagree strongly. This is one of the questions 
asked in scoring the Five-Factor Model of Personality Structure, and it is included in the 
personality section of the 1992-3 questionnaire, separate from job history or current/last 
job characteristics. Hence, the potential concerns about framing effects are minimized. 
For workers who agree strongly, moderately, or slightly, preferring work that is routine 
and simple, x = 1. 
Finally, mismatch between job routinization and worker’s preference for routine 
and simple work is measured as the absolute value of the difference between z and x,               
m(z,x) = ⎪z – x⎪. I adopt this approach because absolute value seems to be the most 
intuitive way of thinking about the discrepancy between two variables. Note that for 
binary indicators, the absolute-value deviation is equivalent to the quadratic deviation. 
                                                 
5 Of course, simultaneity biases may exist: workers who are unhappy with earnings that they receive may 
also respond negatively when asked about job attributes (McNabb, 1989). 
18 
4.2. Econometric Specifications 
My model establishes two main results. First, the relationship between the wage rate and 
mismatch is given by: 
  )) , ( ( ) 1 ( )) , ( ( )) , ( (
* x z m A θ x z m v θ x z m w − + = (18)
As Proposition 1 states, depending on the size of the mismatch productivity effect relative 
to the mismatch compensating-wage-differential effect, the effect on the wage rate will 
be positive, negative, or zero. Hence, the baseline empirical specification, after a log-
linearization of (18), to investigate Proposition 1 is: 
  ε x z m δ α w + + = ) , ( ) ln(   (19)
where m(z,x) = ⎪z – x⎪.  
The model is a simplification of reality and it abstracts from other wage 
determinants, both at the firm and the worker levels. If these wage determinants are 
correlated with mismatch, then omitting them from (19) is going to bias the mismatch 
estimate. Indeed, mismatch may be related to both firm’s technology and workers’ skills. 
Firms with worse technologies are likely to pay lower wages and to have more difficulty 
in searching for and hiring workers who match. At the same time, workers with worse 
skills  also  are  likely  to  be  paid  lower  wages  and  to  end  up  being  mismatched.                        
The empirical exercise acknowledges that by running additional regressions with some 
covariates. Workers’ skills (S) are measured by education, IQ score at high school, and 
high-school rank. Firms’ technologies (T) are measured by firm size dummies and 
industry dummies. Hence, the augmented specification is: 
  μ δ α + Λ + Π + + = T S x z m w ) , ( ) ln(   (20)
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The model also establishes a well-defined relationship between workers’ utility 
and mismatch: 
  ))] , ( ( )) , ( ( )[ 1 ( )) , ( (
* x z m v x z m A θ x z m u − − = (21)
Moreover, according to Proposition 2, the effect of mismatch on utility is 
predicted to be negative. Hence, if the specification is: 
  ξ ϕφ ς + + = ) , ( x z m u   (22)
a negative estimate of ϕ will be consistent with Proposition 2. 
As a proxy for utility, I use job satisfaction
6. Clark (2004) uses job satisfaction as 
a measure of the utility associated with working. He emphasizes that it is a good measure 
of how a worker feels about his or her job, often predicting workers’ future behavior 
(quits, productivity, absenteeism), better than such objective variables as wage and hours 
of work in the case of quits.  
The job satisfaction measure is constructed from the answer to the question: “All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your job as a whole?”: very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied. The regressions are estimated as 
Ordered Probits. Again, as in the previous case, the empirical exercise also is performed 
adding some covariates: 
  ζ φ ς + Ψ + Θ + + = T S x z m u ) , ( (23)
                                                 
6 In empirical work, the use of job satisfaction has been rejected by economists as being useful or 
interesting for economic analysis (and it is still rejected by many economists today). Perhaps, as recognized 
by Freeman (1978), that is because it is a measure based on “what people say” rather than “what people 
do”. Freeman notices that when using job satisfaction measures, complexities arise due to its dependency 
on psychological states. Nevertheless, he highlights that it contains useful information for predicting and 
understanding behavior.  
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Finally, to assess the role of mismatch on compensating wage differential 
estimates, I estimate the econometric specification defined in (4). The augmented version 
of (4) is given by  
  τ δ γ β α + Λ + Π + + + + = T S x z m x z w ) , ( ) ln(   (24)
which I compare with standard wage equations that do not control either for workers’ 
preferences or mismatch. 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7 presents the main descriptive statistics of the WLS sample for currently 
employed individuals (1992-3). A first glance at the Table shows that, on average, male 
workers in non-routinized jobs earn $18.09 per hour, while male workers in routinized 
jobs earn $15.21: a difference of approximately $3 in the hourly wage. Women in non-
routinized jobs earn $11.41 per hour, while women in routinized jobs earn $9.33. 
Although these are unadjusted averages, workers do not seem to be compensated for               
job routinization.  
The Table also shows that the majority of men (52%) work in non-routinized jobs, 
while the majority of women work in routinized jobs (64%). At the same time, the 
fraction of workers who prefer routine and simple work is higher for women than for 
men: 0.24 versus 0.18. The fact that workers in non-routinized jobs are not compensated 
for job routinization is even more striking given that the supply of routine-preferring 
workers seems to be very low (24% of male workers, 18% of female workers) in 
comparison to the demand for them (48% of male workers, 64% of female workers). 
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Can mismatch explain the apparent lower wages in routinized jobs? The 
percentages of well-matched workers (according to job routinization and preference for 
routine and simple work) are 62% and 53% for men and women, respectively. Hence, 
mismatch is higher for women (47%) than for men (38%). For both men and women, 
mismatch is very high. Moreover, mismatch may be responsible for (part of) the 
difference in average wages between routinized and non-routinized jobs: mismatched 
men are paid $15.51 per hour while those who are well-matched are paid $17.44 per 
hour. For women the difference is smaller: $9.61 versus $10.53. 
The vast majority of individuals are satisfied with their jobs: 90% (91%) of male 
(female) workers are fairly or very satisfied with their jobs. As expected, men are paid 
higher hourly wages than women: $16.71 versus $10.09. Not surprisingly, given the 
cohort under study, born around 1940, women on average are less educated than men. 
Table 8 shows the distribution of workers (by their preferences for routine and 
simple work) across jobs (by routinization). Among men, 42% of non-routine-preferring 
workers are mismatched into routinized jobs (567/1359*100), while this percentage is 57 
for women (758/1331*100). For both men and women, the percentage of mismatched 
workers is lower in non-routinized jobs. This is consistent with the fact that the majority 
of men and women are non-routine-preferring workers (76% of men, and 82% of 
women). 
Table 9 describes an interesting feature of my data: there are no differences in 
average wages between mismatched and well-matched routine workers. Indeed, the 




5.1. Model Estimates: the effect of mismatch in job routinization on wages and job 
satisfaction 
Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 present the results of Propositions 1 and 2. The model’s 
prediction regarding the wage effect of mismatch is ambiguous. Table 10 shows that 
mismatch is negatively associated with hourly wages for men. According to my model, 
this suggests that the (negative) mismatch productivity effect dominates the (positive) 
mismatch compensating-wage-differential effect. 
It is important to bear in mind that the model is a simplification of the real world 
and abstracts from other wage determinants. For this reason, columns (2)-(9) account for 
observed differences at the worker, firm, and industry levels that may be related to 
mismatch. The estimated effect of mismatch seems to be somewhere between –0.110 
(column (1)) and –0.053 (column (6)).  
However, column (6) may be problematic because of (over)controlling, since it 
includes completed education and its determinants at the same time, IQ at high school 
and high school rank. Note too that because I have neither variation in age nor education 
below high school, simultaneously adding education (indeed, adding education above 
high school) and industry dummies is likely to cause endogeneity problems. Furthermore, 
the average returns to education are known to be higher for women than for men, and this 
specification violates that (see column (6) in Table 11). For this reason, I prefer the 
specification in column (9), which leads to an estimate of –0.073 for the mismatch effect: 
on average, mismatched male workers earn 7.3% less than well-matched workers. In that 
model, I control (indirectly) for education through its determinants (IQ at high school and 
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high school rank). Note that in my sample, all individuals have at least high school 
education, so I do not control for education after high school, which indeed seems to be 
predicted by IQ at high school and high school rank. All specifications are consistent 
with this story, but with different intensity. 
The results for women are reported in Table 11. They are qualitatively the same 
as for men, but the estimated mismatch effect is 60-85% of the mismatch effect for men, 
depending on the specification. 
Overall, Tables 10 and 11 suggest that the mismatch productivity effect dominates 
the mismatch compensating-wage-differential effect (see Proposition 1).  
My model also predicts that mismatch has a negative effect on utility. Tables 12 
and 13, using job satisfaction as a proxy for utility, show that job satisfaction is 
negatively related to mismatch. Mismatched male and female workers report lower 
satisfaction levels. This relationship is robust to the addition of other covariates, which is 
evidence in favor of Proposition 2.  
Finally, Tables 14 and 15 report the same regressions as in Tables 12 and 13 but 
conditioning on wages. Again, the results confirm the negative relationship between 
mismatch and job satisfaction. 
Hence, the empirical evidence from Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15 is consistent with 






5.2. Implications for Compensating-Wage-Differentials Estimates: the effect of job 
routinization on wages 
So far, the results are consistent with my model (Propositions 1 and 2). It is a simple 
model and its empirical predictions cannot be rejected by the data. In this subsection, I 
assess whether the model can shed light on the compensating wage differentials puzzle. 
In other words, I analyze the effect of accounting for mismatch on the association 
between job routinization and wages.  
Recall that the crucial identifying assumption for the effect of mismatch on 
compensating-wage-differentials estimates is that the compensating wage differential 
applies to anyone working in the routinized sector (assuming that that sector has a 
shortage of workers in the absence of pay differentials), whether he prefers routine or 
non-routine work. By contrast, the productivity effect applies only to workers who are 
mismatched, that is, whose sectors do not match their preferences. 
Tables 16 and 17 present the results on the effect of job routinization on wages for 
men and women, respectively. Column (1) in Table 16 shows that, on average, male 
workers in routinized jobs earn 10% less than male workers in non-routinized jobs. Once 
the worker’s preference for routine work is accounted for, this penalty is reduced to 9% 
(see column (2)). Column (3) shows that routinized jobs on average pay 6% less than 
non-routinized jobs when mismatch is controlled; on average, mismatched workers earn 
4% less than well-matched workers. Hence, if mismatch is not accounted for, the 
negative effect of job routinization on wages is overestimated. Indeed, once mismatch is 
included as a new variable in the wage regression, I can explain a substantial portion of 
the incorrectly-signed estimate for job routinization. Columns (4)-(6) show similar 
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qualitative results: male workers in routinized jobs earn 12% less than their counterparts 
in non-routinized jobs (see column (4)). This penalty decreases to 11% once I adjust for 
differences in preferences (see column (5)). Finally, once workers’ preferences and 
mismatch are accounted for, this difference is reduced to 8% (see column (6)). 
Table 17 reports similar results for women. Accounting for differences in 
preferences slightly decreases the job-routinization wage penalty, from 11% to 9% 
(columns (1) and (2)), or from 12% to 11% (columns (4) and (5)). However, adding 
mismatch into the model seems to be important: the effect of job routinization decreases 
from 9% to 4 % (columns (2) and (3)), or from 11% to 5% (columns (5) and (6)). 
Overall, two features of the data stand out. First, mismatch is negatively related to 
wages. This is consistent with both my assignment model and Borghans et al. (2007): 
people are most productive in jobs that match their style, and they earn less when they 
have to shift to other jobs. Indeed, I find a mismatch effect after accounting for worker 
type (worker’s preference for routine work) and job type (job routinization), which 
supports my model. Second, once mismatch is accounted for, the coefficient on job 
routinization is attenuated. The evident mismatch effect can explain a substantial portion 
(but not all) of the incorrectly-signed compensating differential for job routinization 







6. Robustness Checks 
This section addresses some potential concerns about previous estimates: omitted 
variables, alternative measures of job routinization, routine-preferring worker and 
mismatch, and the sensitivity of OLS estimates to outliers. 
 
6.1. Omitted Variables 
Although I have a rich set of observables that helps me to defend my identifying 
assumption, my regression contains two explanatory variables, worker’s preferences and 
mismatch, which may well be endogenously determined and thus may compromise the 
interpretation of my estimates. I try to overcome this shortcoming by controlling for both 
tenure and adult cognition score, variables that previously were omitted.  
Workers’ preferences are likely to be affected by their labor market experience. 
More specifically, an individual’s working experience on a particular job (tenure) is 
likely to affect his preferences for such a job. Although I do not have suitable data for 
assessing whether workers’ preferences change over time, I can check the sensitivity of 
my results to the addition of tenure: keeping tenure constant, the effect of preferences on 
wages is obtained, net of the effect of tenure on preferences. 
Further, in my model I assume that mismatch is random and reflects lower 
comparative advantage. That is to say, mismatch has a causal effect on wages. However, 
that assumption may well be too restrictive, given the age of my sample. While one can 
argue that for young workers mismatch is likely to be (at least in part) driven by the lack 
of information (in particular, the lack of labor market knowledge), for workers in their 
early fifties mismatch is more likely to reflect low ability, not a lack of labor market 
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knowledge. For this reason, I also control for a measure of adult cognition. If my new 
estimates do not substantially differ from my previous ones, then this would be evidence, 
albeit tentative at best, that the estimated mismatch effect does not capture the effect of 
unobserved ability, provided that my measure of adult cognition is a good proxy for 
unobserved ability
7.    
According to the results reported in Tables 18 and 19, my previous estimates are 
robust to the addition of these new controls. The new estimates of the effects of job 
routinization and mismatch are very similar, indeed almost identical, to my previous 
estimates in Tables 16 and 17.  
 
6.2. Alternative Measures 
I chose the threshold on the fraction of working time doing the same things over and over 
to define a job as routinized and the cutoff for classifying the worker as a routine-
preferring or a non-routine-preferring one arbitrarily. In this subsection, I check the 
sensitivity of my estimates to such arbitrary decisions by using alternative criteria. Now, I 
classify a job as routinized if the fraction of time doing the same things over and over is 
above the third quartile on the distribution of the fraction of time. And, a worker is 
classified as routine-preferring if her score on the preference for routine and simple work 
is above the third quartile on the distribution of preferences. The new mismatch measure 
is the absolute value of the difference between these new alternative measures.  
                                                 
7 My proxy for unobserved ability is the total cognition score reported in the WLS, measured in 1992. It is 
based on eight of the fourteen items from the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). According to the 
WLS documents, the simplest items from the WAIS were eliminated because the general ability of the 
sample is high enough to cause little variation in response to those items. One example of the questions 
asked to compute the cognition score is: “In what way are an orange and a banana alike?” 
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In Tables 20 and 21 I provide new estimates, both using these alternative 
measures and accounting for differences in tenure and adult cognition. The new results 
are very similar to the ones obtained before. For men, workers in routinized jobs on 
average earn 9% less than their counterparts in non-routinized jobs (column (4) in Table 
20). Column (5) shows that accounting for differences in preferences makes the wage 
penalty lower: 7%. Finally, adding mismatch into the model (column (6)) decreases the 
wage penalty even further: 4%. Note too that being mismatched is associated with a wage 
penalty of 8%. Similar qualitative results are shown for women in Table 21. 
 
6.3. Sensitivity to Outliers 
OLS estimates are known to be sensitive to outliers. In my analysis, I trimmed both the 
bottom 3% and the top 3% of the wage distribution in order to avoid the influence of 
extreme values. Here, I go one step further and perform a median Quantile regression 
analysis to make sure that my previous OLS estimates are not driven by extreme values 
of the wage distribution.  
The new (median) estimates reported in Tables 22 and 23, which also control for 
tenure and adult cognition, are robust to outliers and very similar to my previous OLS 
estimates. In Table 22, column (4) shows that, at the median, male workers in routinized 
jobs earn 12% less than male workers in non-routinized jobs. Once the worker’s 
preference for routine work is accounted for, this penalty is reduced to 9% (column (5)). 
Column (6) shows that routinized jobs at the median pay 5% less than non-routinized 
jobs when mismatch is controlled. Mismatched workers earn 6% less than well-matched 
workers. Table 23 shows similar results for women.  
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6.4. Other Issues 
The discrete approach to measuring job routinization and workers’ preferences is 
appealing because it is neat and clear cut. Unfortunately, it does not take full advantage 
of all the available information contained in my data. In this subsection, I exploit the 
variability in workers’ preferences and measures of job routinization. Here, job 
routinization is measured as a continuous variable; workers’ preferences are measured 
by several binary indicators; and mismatch is measured as it is in most of the paper (see 
pages 19 and 20). More specifically, the new job routinization variable is the fraction of 
working time doing the same things over and over on the job (as in Tables 3 and 4). 
Workers’ preference for routine is captured by several binary indicators: Routine-
Preferring Worker 1 (equal to 1 for workers who agree strongly or moderately with the 
statement “I see myself as someone who prefers work that is routine and simple”, zero 
otherwise); Routine-Preferring Worker 2 (equal to 1 for workers who agree slightly, 
neither agree nor disagree, or disagree slightly with the previous statement, zero 
otherwise); Routine-Preferring Worker 3 (equal to 1 for those workers who disagree 
moderately or strongly with the previous statement, zero otherwise).  
Tables 24 and 25 present the new estimates using these alternative measures of 
job routinization and workers’ preferences. In these tables the omitted category is 
Routine-Preferring Worker 3. The new estimates are very similar to the earlier ones. 
Finally, it is worth reporting the estimates from specification (17), the standard 
difference-in-difference estimator. Remember that the negative productivity effect of 
being mismatched corresponds to a positive interaction between a worker’s taste for 
routinized work and the degree to which her observed job is routinized. For men, the 
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coefficient on the interaction term, using the models described in columns (3) and (6) 
from Table 16 are 0.086 (statistically significant at the 5% level) and 0.080 (statistically 
significant at the 1% level), respectively. For women, these coefficients are 0.151 and 
0.142, both statistically significant at the 1% level. 
To sum up, my results appear to be robust to a large variety of adjustments. 
Nonetheless, the next section addresses some caveats of my analysis, which are related 
mainly to the model and the dataset in the paper. 
 
7. Caveats of my Analysis 
The model offered in the paper is simple, easy to follow, and useful in showing the two 
opposite effects of mismatch. Although it is deliberately parsimonious, i.e., the only 
economic decision is about how to share the match surplus, the model helps us to think 
about the implications of mismatch when we look for compensating wage differentials. 
Moreover, because mismatch is taken as a given, the model does not restrict its possible 
determinants. 
However, taking mismatch as a given has its own limitations. In order to evaluate 
the net gains from reducing or eliminating mismatch, we need to estimate the costs 
associated with such a policy. Unfortunately, because the determinants of mismatch are 
not defined, such a cost-benefit analysis cannot be performed
8. Of course, it must also be 
                                                 
8 An upper bound on the gross gains from eliminating mismatch can be estimated easily. Using the model 
specified in column (6) from Table 16, I can estimate the expected (adjusted) wages for both well-matched 
and mismatched male workers. The expected hourly wage for well-matched workers is approximately US$ 
17, while the expected hourly wage for mismatched workers is approximately US$ 15. Hence, the expected 
increase in the hourly wage rate for mismatched workers is US$ 2. Since the percentage of mismatched 
workers is 38%, the estimated increase in the average hourly wage rate for males is US$ 0.76 (76 cents of 
dollar), or approximately 4.5% of the average hourly wage rate for males in 1992. All of these quantities 
are expressed in US dollars of 1992. 
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recognized that this limitation avoids the possibility of drawing conclusions from dubious 
specifications. 
My data is good enough to provide the first attempt at understanding the role of 
mismatch on compensating wage differentials, but it is not ideal. The sample under 
analysis covers workers in their early fifties, which makes it hard to believe that all 
observed mismatch is random. Second, mismatch can only be studied for the job 
routinization attribute. A richer dataset would contain longitudinal information on young 
workers and several job attributes, ideally measured at the firm level, and then matched 
perfectly with the workers’ data on an individual basis. Such a dataset would be very 
useful for disentangling whether mismatch reflects lower comparative advantage or lower 
unobserved ability, and for assessing the implications of mismatch in multiple 
dimensions. 
Finally, it should be noted that the absence of an instrument for mismatch 
prevents me from arguing that the associations I document are causal. However, the rich 
set of covariates I consider in the WLS (education, IQ at high school, high school rank, 
cognition score, preferences, tenure, firm size dummies, and industry dummies) help me 









In this paper my goal has been to argue that previous estimates of compensating wage 
differentials are inconclusive because they do not account for the discrepancy between 
workers’ preferences and job attributes. Both casual empiricism and research results 
suggest that this discrepancy indeed exists. In my sample, 38% of the men and 47% of 
the women appear to be mismatched. 
I argue that this discrepancy, or mismatch, has two different effects on wages.    
On the one hand, mismatched workers need to be compensated for performing a job 
(task) that does not match their type (preferences). This is the compensating wage 
differential effect: mismatch does increase wages. On the other hand, mismatched 
workers are less productive in performing a job (task) that does not match their type 
(preferences), since workers’ preferences are likely correlated with comparative 
advantage. This is the productivity effect: mismatch decreases wages. Therefore, the 
effect of mismatch on wages is ambiguous. If mismatch is not accounted for, then the 
association between wages and job attributes may be picking up the correlation between 
job attributes, preferences, and mismatch. 
I present a simple assignment model with Nash bargaining over wages in which 
randomly matched workers and firms bargain over the match surplus to decide the wage 
rate. This model predicts that mismatch is positively related to wages when it is simply a 
disamenity. However, once mismatch also reduces the match surplus, there is a negative 
effect on wages. Thus, in this last case, the effect of mismatch is ambiguous. In both 
cases, the effect on workers’ utility and firms’ profits is negative. 
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My empirical analysis uses the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) and focuses 
on job routinization (the fraction of working time spent doing the same things over and 
over). I present several pieces of empirical evidence to support my model. First, 
mismatch is negatively related to wages, which is consistent with the negative mismatch 
productivity effect dominating the positive compensating wage differential effect. 
Second, I find that job satisfaction is negatively related to mismatch.  
I also report the implications of omitting from wage regressions mismatch and 
workers’ preferences in assessing the role of job routinization on wages (under the 
assumption that the compensating wage differential would apply to anyone working in 
the routinized sector but that the productivity effect would apply only to those workers 
who are mismatched). For both men and women, I find that the negative relationship 
between wages and job routinization is attenuated once mismatch and workers’ 
preferences are accounted for. The evident mismatch effect can explain a substantial 
portion (but not all) of the incorrectly-signed compensating wage differential for job 
routinization that previous analyses have indicated. 
In my view, this paper points a new method of assessing the existence of 
compensating wage differentials. Clearly, as discussed in the section on caveats, much 
more work needs to be done on the theoretical front, for instance, by endogenizing 
mismatch. Nevertheless, I anticipate that as long as there are search frictions that ensure 
that some workers remain in jobs that are not optimal given the existing wage rates, the 
results of the assignment model presented here will generalize to a market setting. Given 
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38Table 1: Percentage of currently employed individuals reporting that job 







    
Being able to do different things rather than the same things over 
and over 
 
Being able to work without frequent checking by a supervisor 
 
Having the opportunity to get on-the-job training 
 
Having a job that other people regard highly 
 





















Source: Table 2 in Andrew et al. (2006). 
 
 
Table 2: Fraction of weekly worked hours doing the same things over and over 







    
Professional and Technical Specialty Operations 
 




Administrative Support Occupations (including clerical) 
 
Precise Production, Craft, and Repair Occupations 
 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 7: Descriptive statistics. 
  
   Men     Women   
 Obs.  Mean  SD  Obs.  Mean  SD 
Hourly wage routinized jobs 
 




(z = 1 if fraction of weekly 
worked hours doing the same 
things over and over is equal 




(Preference for routine and 
simple work: x = 1 if 
strongly/moderately/slightly  
agree, x = 0 if 
strongly/moderately/slightly/ 
disagree or neither agree nor 
disagree) 
 
Mismatch, |z – x| 
 
Fraction of weekly worked 
hours doing the same things 
over and over 
 











































































































































































































































48Table 7: (continued) 
  
   Men     Women   
 Obs.  Mean  SD  Obs.  Mean  SD 
Hourly wage mismatched 
workers 
 











IQ (measured at high school) 
 
High School Rank 
 
Education  
(years of completed education) 
 













































































































































































49Table 8: Distribution of workers across jobs, 1992-3. 
     
(Number of observations)  z = 0    z = 1 
     
Male     
     






     






     
Female 
      






     






     




Table 9: Average hourly wages by worker-job type, US$ 1992-3. 
     
(Number of observations)  z = 0    z = 1 
     
Male     
     






     






     
Female 
      






     






     































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































54Table 14: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
OLS estimates for men. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 



































































































































































55Table 15: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
OLS estimates for women. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58Table 3A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Additional covariates. 
OLS estimates for men. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 























































































































































































































59Table 4A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Additional covariates. 
OLS estimates for women. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 























































































































































































































60Table 5A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Additional covariates and alternative measures I. 
OLS estimates for men. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 























































































































































































































61Table 6A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Additional covariates and alternative measures I. 
OLS estimates for women. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 
















































































































































































































62Table 7A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Additional covariates. 
Quantile Median estimates for men. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 























































































































































































































63Table 8A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Additional covariates. 
Quantile Median estimates for women. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  















IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 























































































































































































































64Table 9A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Alternative measures II. 
OLS estimates for men. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  




Routine-Preferring Worker 1 
 
 











IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 




































































































































































































































Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
65Table 10A: Mismatch and compensating wage differentials. 
Alternative measures II. 
OLS estimates for women. 
Dependent variable: ln(hourly wage)  




Routine-Preferring Worker 1 
 
 











IQ Measured at High School 
 
 




Firm Size Dummies 




































































































































































































































Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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